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ABSTRACT
Marking is the act of placing a patent number on a product or its packaging. The doctrine
of marking estoppel deals with whether the act of marking will preclude denials of patent
infringement or patent validity challenges. This comment reviews the history of marking
estoppel and determines that although the Federal Circuit has expressed reservations
about the doctrine, marking estoppel remains viable. This comment argues that marking
estoppel should preclude a marking party from denying patent infringement when the
marking party has acted with scienter and the asserting party has come to court with
clean hands. However, because of the important public interest in having only valid
patents in the marketplace, marking estoppel should not preclude patent validity
challenges. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in MedImmune, marking estoppel
could become a powerful shield for increasingly defenseless patentees.
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REDISCOVERING THE DOCTRINE OF MARKING ESTOPPEL AFTER
MEDIMMUNE BALANCING THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE RIGHTS
MICHAEL D. KARSON*

INTRODUCTION

Estoppel is "[a] bar that prevents one from asserting a claim ... that contradicts
what one has said or done before."' The doctrine of estoppel in the context of patent
law has a variety of applications.2 This comment explores the history, viability, and
applicability of one type of estoppel, the doctrine of marking estoppel.
Patent "marking" is defined by statute. 3 A manufacturer of a product "marks"
the product as protected under a patent by physically placing the applicable patent
number on the product itself.4 If the nature of the product requires, a manufacturer
5
may also affix a label bearing the patent number to the product or packaging.
The issue, then, is whether a party marking a product is estopped from either
attacking the validity of the patent 6 or claiming that the patent is not infringed 7 by
the marked product. The law regarding the doctrine of marking estoppel has varied
as much by jurisdiction as it has over time.8 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has yet to issue a definitive ruling with respect to the viability of
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of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, May 2004. Thank you to my editor, Jennifer Gregory, and the staff of THE
JOHN MARSHALL REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW for their invaluable editorial assistance.
Available at www.jmripl.com.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004).
2 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)
(prosecution history estoppel, also known as file-wrapper estoppel); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L.
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (equitable estoppel); Diamond Scientific Co. v.
Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1265 (1988) (assignor
estoppel); In re Kroekel, 803 F.2d 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (interference estoppel).
3 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (recognizing marking as actual notice that a product is patented in
order for a patentee to collect damages in an infringement action). Patent marking, as defined in
the statute, is the act from which marking estoppel arises. Id. Indeed, in his renowned treatise,
Professor Chisum referenced patent marking when discussing marking estoppel. 5B DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.06[1] [e] n.147 (2007).
4 35 U.S.C. § 287(a).

Id.
See id. § 282 ("Apatent shall be presumed valid.").
7 Seo id. § 271(a) (defining an infringer as one who "without authority makes, uses, offers to
sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent").
8 Compare Regina Music Box Co. v. Newell, 131 F. 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (estopping a party
from denying the validity of a patent due to stamping a product as patented), with Beckman
Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir. 1970) ("[W]e hold as a matter of
law that licensees are no longer estopped to challenge the validity of a licensed patent merely
because they have marked their products with the patent number.").
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the doctrine of marking estoppel; indeed, the court seems to have gone out of its way
to avoid addressing this issue head-on. 9
That the Federal Circuit has not developed a body of case law regarding the
doctrine of marking estoppel should not be surprising. The doctrine of marking
estoppel is most likely to appear in cases involving patent licenses, pursuant to
which, a licensee may be required to mark its products with one or more patent
numbers. 10 Until recently, licensees were not able to challenge a licensed patent
while they remained licensees because it was thought that the license itself
"obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit."11 Without a reasonable
apprehension of being sued, no actual case or controversy existed between the
parties. 12 The Federal Circuit had always held that a patent licensee had to
terminate its license agreement in order to obtain declaratory judgment jurisdiction
and challenge a licensed patent. 13 If a licensee terminated its license agreement but
continued to sell the same products, it risked being held liable for willful
infringement and faced the possibility of treble damages. 14 Thus, very few, if any,
justiciable cases would even present the issue of marking estoppel.
In 2007, however, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.15 In MedImmune, the Court ruled that a
licensee need not terminate its license in order to obtain declaratory judgment
jurisdiction.16 This decision made it easier for a licensee to challenge its licensor's
patent by eliminating the requirement of terminating the license prior to bringing
suit. 17 Thus, licensees are now more likely to attack the validity of licensed patents
because, if successful, the licensee will no longer need to pay royalties for the patent
at issue. In response to these suits, licensors may attempt to assert the doctrine of

9 Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven
assuming the doctrine remains viable, it does not apply to the facts of this case."); High Frequency
Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (High FrequencyIf, No. 95-1468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
9957, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996) ("It is not necessary to decide whether the doctrine of marking
estoppel is still viable."); Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 890 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("Whatever the validity of the 'marking estoppel' line of cases, we do not find [them]
applicable to the present case.").
10See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a). In order to recover damages in an infringement suit, a patentee
must provide actual notice of the patent to the infringer. Id. Of course, filing a patent infringement
suit constitutes notice under the statute. Id. However, to maximize these damages, a patentee may
require its licensees to mark their products with the patent number, thus putting potential
infringers on notice of the patent as early as possible. Id.
11Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed, 543 U.S.
941 (2004).
12 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
13 Gon-Probo, 359 F.3d at 1376 (finding no declaratory judgment jurisdiction because the
licensee continued to fulfill its obligations under the license); e 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006)
(authorizing declaratory judgment jurisdiction).
14 See Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007); 35 U.S.C. § 284.
15 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
160Id. at 777 ([P]etitioner was not required, insofar as Article III [of the Constitution of the
United States of America] is concerned, to break or terminate its ... license agreement before
seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable,
or not infringed.").
17

Id.
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marking estoppel as a bar to prevent a licensee's patent validity challenge, denial of
8
patent infringement, or both.1
Part I of this comment surveys the historical development of the doctrine of
marking estoppel. This review leads to the conclusion, detailed in Part II, that the
doctrine of marking estoppel remains a viable legal doctrine. Part II analyzes the
different components of the doctrine. Finally, Part III describes a workable theory of
the modern doctrine of marking estoppel, consistent with the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Medlmm une.

I. BACKGROUND
The circumstances necessary to invoke the doctrine of marking estoppel have
been historically rare, but after the Supreme Court's decision in MedImmune, it can
be used as a shield by patentees who are finding themselves increasingly defenseless.
Section A surveys early cases addressing marking estoppel. These cases establish
the foundation from which the doctrine emerged and frame the manner in which
courts have dealt with marking estoppel. Section B analyzes a series of cases that
applied marking estoppel contemporaneously with other estoppel doctrines. Section
B concludes with the Supreme Court's elimination of the doctrine of patent licensee
estoppel in Lear,Inc. v. Adkins.19 With Lear,the Supreme Court disposed of one tool
that courts and litigants had used to prevent patent validity challenges. Section C
reviews cases since Lear, including the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that address marking estoppel and whether the
doctrine of marking estoppel might take the place of patent licensee estoppel.

A. Early Case Law
The equitable 20 doctrine of marking estoppel was recognized, in some form, as
early as 1901 in PiagetNovelty Co. v. Headley.21 In that case, the inventor, Headley,
manufactured products under his patent and marked them as covered by the
patent. 22 He subsequently sold an exclusive license to manufacture and sell products
under the patent to Piaget Novelty yet continued to manufacture and mark precisely
the same product. 23 The Second Circuit ruled that because Headley was still
marking his products with the patent number even though he no longer had a right
18See, e.g., Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (marking
estoppel asserted to preclude a denial of patent infringement); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1970) (marking estoppel asserted to preclude a
patent validity challenge); Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. (Crane 1),364 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
afFdinpart,rev'dinpart,504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974) (marking estoppel asserted to preclude both
a denial of patent infringement and a patent validity challenge).
19395 U.S. 653 (1969).
20 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 578 (8th ed. 2004) ("1. Just; consistent with principles of justice
and right. 2. Existing in equity; available or sustainable by an action in equity, or under the rules
and principles of equity.").
21 108 F. 870 (2d Cir. 1901).
22
23

Id. at 872.
Id.
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to do so, he was precluded from claiming that his products did not infringe the
24
patent.
In 1904, marking estoppel again reared its head in Regina Music Box Co. v.
Newell.25 The court ruled that the act of placing a patent stamp on a product after
the patent license expired precluded the defendants from attacking the validity of the
patent. 26 The act of marking the product was seen as "leading the purchaser to
believe that the license still continue[d]."27 This is often an argument raised in
28
support of using marking estoppel to preclude a patent validity challenge.
In Kant-Skore Piston Co. v. Sinclair Manufacturing Corp.,29 a licensee
30
manufactured and sold a product that was an improvement of the licensed patent.
The licensee, while refusing to pay royalties on its new product, marked it as covered
by the licensed patent. 31 The court held that as long as the licensee continued to
mark its products and associate them with the patent, the license would cover the
marked products. 32 Because of licensee estoppel, this decision effectively precluded
the licensee from denying infringement of the patent. 33 Kant-Skore was also among
the first cases to deal with suits by licensors for royalties on marked products,
34
including those not within the original scope of the licensing agreement.
The doctrine of marking estoppel, without being so identified, appeared in Collis
Co. v. Consolidated Machine Too] Corp. of America.35 In that case, the plaintiff
argued that its product did not embody the patent in order to preserve its rights in
an associated trademark.36 The court noted that because the plaintiff had marked its
24 Id.at 872-73. In dictum, the court indicated that it would have dealt with a patent validity

challenge by invoking the "well-settled" principle that an inventor and applicant for a patent may
not challenge its validity. Id. at 871. Thus, the court did not even consider the effect of the doctrine
of marking estoppel on a patent validity challenge. Id.
25 131 F. 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
26 Id. at 606-07. The defendants' only defense to the infringement suit was the invalidity of
the patent. Id.at 606.
27 Id. at 606-07; see also Harley C. Loney Co. v. Perfect Equip. Corp., 178 F.2d 165, 169-70
(7th Cir. 1949) ("The fact that [the licensee] still places upon its manufactured products the number
of the [patent in suit] is a representation to the public that the .. .product marked is authorized to
be manufactured and sold under the patent.").
28 Harley, 178 F.2d at 170.
29 32 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1929).
30 Id.at 884.
'31Id.('[The defendant] continued, however, not only to sell its product under the [same trade
name] and to mark its goods 'patented,' but also to account to plaintiff for royalties thereon.").
32 I-d. at 886 ("[The licensee's] obligations under the license continue so long as it identifies its
pistons with the [patented] pistons in any way, even though it asserts a deviation therefrom.")
(emphasis added). The defendant in Kant-Skore failed to effectively terminate the license even
though it ceased payment of royalties because of a common understanding of the parties resulting
from their prior course of conduct. Id. at 885. The plaintiff regularly sent the defendant notices of
cancellation, as contemplated in the license, when the defendant failed to make a royalty payment.
!-d. at 884. These notices were apparently so common that they were treated not as notices of
cancellation but rather as "notices to pay up." Id.
33 Id.at 886.
34 See, e.g., Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 186 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1951); Harley C.
Loney Co. v. Perfect Equip. Corp., 178 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1949); Collis Co. v. Consol. Mach. Tool
Corp. of Am., 41 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1930).
35 41 F.2d at 641.
36 Id.at 644-45.
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product with both the trademark and the patent number, the patent mark belied the
plaintiffs assertion that its product was not covered by the patenti7 In fact, the
plaintiff marked its product as patented for at least a year after the expiration of the
patent.38 This case demonstrates the primary rationale for the doctrine of marking
estoppel-a party should not benefit from a misrepresentation to the public.
Thus, by 1930, marking estoppel had been used effectively in at least three
different Circuit Courts of Appeal. 39 However, none of the cases employing marking
estoppel identified it as such. 40 Additionally, each of these cases confused or
41
complicated the issue in one way or another.

B. MarkingEstoppel's Interplay with Other Doctrines
To examine the doctrine of marking estoppel, it must be studied in light of the
doctrines of licensee estoppel or assignor estoppel, the other estoppel doctrines that
often recur alongside marking estoppel. 42 In Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v.
American Ore Reclamation Co.,43 decided in 1941, the contours of the doctrine of
marking estoppel began to emerge. Dwight & Lloyd involved a licensee that required
sub-licensees to affix a plate referring to the licensor's patents on each of the
manufactured machines. 44 The defendant licensee argued that the patents in suit
were invalid and, in the alternative, that it did not infringe the patents in suit. 45 The
court dealt with the patent validity challenge under the doctrine of licensee
estoppel. 46 Then, the court invoked the doctrine of marking estoppel to preclude the
'37

Id. at 645.

38 Id.
3) Id.
at 641 (Eighth Circuit holding); Kant-Skore Piston Co. v. Sinclair Mfg. Corp., 32 F.2d 882
(6th Cir. 1929); Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley, 108 F. 870 (2d Cir. 1901).
40 Collis, 41 F.2d at 645 ("The plaintiff, having enjoyed the benefits of the monopoly protected
by this patent, cannot consistently now be heard to say that in fact the device manufactured and
sold by it was not the device so patented."); Kant-Skore, 32 F.2d at 886 ("[Defendant's] obligations
under the license continue so long as it identifies its pistons with the [patented] pistons in any way,
even though it asserts a deviation therefrom."); Pj>gnt, 108 F. at 873 ("1]t does not lie in the mouth
of Headley to assert, as against complainant, that the banks he used to stamp and sell as being
within said patent are not infringements.").
41 Colis, 41 F.2d at 644-45 (noting that the plaintiff represented that its device was covered by
a patent which had expired); Kant-Skore, 32 F.2d at 884-86 (linking a course of conduct in paying
royalties with the failure of the defendant to effectively cancel the license, thereby preventing the
defendant from denying the patent's validity due to licensee estoppel); Piaget, 108 F. at 871
(referring to the rule that an inventor may not challenge the validity of its own patent).
42 Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(licensee estoppel and marking estoppel); Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 186 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1951) (assignee estoppel and marking estoppel).
43 44 F. Supp. at 401.
44 Id. at 402.
45 Id.
46 Id. ("[A] licensee is estopped to deny validity ..
"); see, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v.
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 836 (1950) ("The general rule is that the licensee under a
patent license agreement may not challenge the validity of the licensed patent ... "); Kant-Skore,
32 F.2d at 885 ("[A] licensee [is] estopped to deny validity .... "). The doctrine of licensee estoppel is
only marginally related to the doctrine of marking estoppel and has its origins in Kiansman v.
Parkhurst,59 U.S. (18 How.) 289 (1856); see generally Nathaniel Dean Kramer, Estoppel to Deny
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licensee from denying infringement of the patents. 47 The fact the licensee had not
marked some of its products with the patent number did not eliminate the estoppel.48
Two estoppel doctrines were also employed by the Sixth Circuit in Kenyon v.
Automatic Instrument Co. 49 The defendant in Kenyon was the successor in interest
of the assignee of the patent in suit. 50 The court first disposed of the defendant's
validity challenge on the grounds of assignor estoppel. 51 The defendant in Kenyon
marked its product with a patent notice listing fourteen patent numbers, including
the one at issue that belonged to the plaintiff.52 Notwithstanding the marking, the
court detailed the ways in which the defendant's product differed from the claims of
the patent and stated the notice itself was "somewhat meaningless." 53 As a result,
the court did not apply marking estoppel and affirmed the district court's ruling that
54
the plaintiff was not entitled to royalties for the product at issue.
In addition to other estoppel doctrines, the doctrine of marking estoppel has also
been combined with a theory of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 55 At
least one court has applied marking estoppel to preclude the defendants from
denying infringement by the doctrine of equivalents of the patent in suit.56 The
defendants in Canaan Products, Inc. v. Edward Don & Co.57 had marketed the

plaintiffs patented product and then, solely on the basis of cost, switched to

Validity-A Slender Reed, 23 N.Y.U. INTRAMURAL L. REV. 237 (1968) (examining the history of the
doctrines of licensee estoppel and assignor estoppel and commenting on the policies of each rule);
James M. Treece, Licensee Estoppel in Patent and Trademark Cases, 53 IOWA L. REV. 525 (1967)
(tracing the doctrine of licensee estoppel back to its origins from the landlord-tenant relationship of
property law); Hal D. Cooper, Estoppel To Challenge Patent Validity: The Case of Private Good
Faith vs. Public Policy, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1122 (1967) (discussing the policies and rationales behind
the doctrine of licensee estoppel, examining the exceptions to the rule, and proposing that courts
should examine the basis of a patent validity challenge before estopping the challenge).
47 Dwight & Lloyd, 44 F. Supp. at 402 ("Defendant, in view of all the circumstances, can not
successfully maintain in this action that the machines bearing plates referring to patents which
plaintiff claims were used by the machines did not embody such patents.").
48 Id. at 402-03. This rule was further clarified in Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 361 F.2d 791, 797 (6th Cir. 1966) ('[The defendant] may not relieve itself of liability for the
payment of royalties by eliminating the patent marking in manufacturing and selling the table of
construction identical with the one previously marked.") (citing Dwight & Lloyd, 44 F. Supp. at 401).
49 186 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1951) (assignee estoppel and marking estoppel).
50oId. at 754.
51 Id. at 755. The doctrine of assignor estoppel is closely related to the doctrine of licensee
estoppel. Cooper, supra note 46, at 1123 ([T]he general rule traditionally has been that both the
assignor and the licensee are estopped to challenge the validity of the patent."). The doctrine
estopped an assignor from denying the validity of its assignee's patent. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg.
Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 349 (1924); Kramer, supra note 46, at 237.
52 Kenyon, 186 F.2d at 755.
5 Id. at 756.
54 Id.
55 Canaan Prods., Inc. v. Edward Don & Co., 273 F. Supp. 492 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff, 388 F.2d
540 (7th Cir. 1968). Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product is an equivalent "if it performs
substantially the same function in substantially the way to obtain the same result." Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950); see also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997) (discussing the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents
and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel).
56 CanaanProds., 273 F. Supp. 492.
57

Id.
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unlicensed copies. 58 The court found the unlicensed copies were equivalents of the
licensed products produced under the patent. 59 The court then applied the doctrine
of marking estoppel to preclude the defendants' denial of infringement. 60 This case
appears to have strained the bounds of the doctrine of marking estoppel because it
61
applies marking estoppel to a seller of marked products, not to the marking party.
By the late 1960s, it appeared to be settled law that the doctrine of marking
estoppel only precluded denials of infringement. 62 Patent validity challenges were
63
typically disposed of using some other type of estoppel, notably licensee estoppel.
A fundamental change in this dynamic occurred in 1969 when the United States
64
Supreme Court eliminated the doctrine of licensee estoppel in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.
Prior to Lear, any licensee of a patent was estopped from challenging the patent's
validity because of a contract doctrine that dictated a party could not receive a
benefit under a contract while asserting the contract was not valid. 65 In Lear, the
Court balanced the "competing demands of the common law of contracts and the
federal law of patents." 66 The Court went on to hold that licensee estoppel was not
"compelled by the spirit of contract law." 67
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are
balanced against the importantpublic interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public
domain. Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic
incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery. If they
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to wouldbe monopolists without need or justification. We think it plain that the
technical requirements of contract doctrine must give way before the

5SId. at 495.
59 Id. ("The accused infringing products do not differ significantly from the patented
product .... They all do the same task in the same manner.") (emphasis added).
(3oId. at 502 (issuing a conclusion of law that the defendants, "having marketed the patented
product of plaintiff at a time when the product was marked with the number of the patent in suit,

and then having switched to unlicensed copies of the patented product, are, under the circumstances
surrounding the switch, estopped to deny infringement.").
(31 Compare id,
with 5B CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.06[1][e] (describing the "doctrine of
'marking estoppel' under which a licensee or other party who hadplaceda patent mark on a product
was estopped") (emphasis added), and ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

§ 12.4(d) (8th ed. 2007) (discussing the "marking estoppel doctrine under which a party, usually a
licensee, who marks itsproductwith the patent number is estopped") (emphasis added).
(2 See supra Parts IA, I.B.
(33See, e.g., Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (licensee estoppel); Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley, 108 F. 870 (2d Cir. 1901) (licensee
estoppel).
(34395 U.S. 653 (1969).
6 Id. at 656.
(36Id. at 668. The "uncertain status of licensee estoppel," according to the Court, was a result of
competing demands. Id. Contract law precludes a purchaser from simply repudiating a bad deal
but patent laws require that ideas belong to the public unless patented. Id. According to the Court,
the result of trying to reconcile these conflicting policies was "a failure" that only produced "a chaos
of conflicting case law." Id.
(37Id. at 670.
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demands of the public interest in the typical situation involving the
68
negotiation of a license after a patent has issued.
The Court elevated the public interest above the private contract interests
between the patent licensor and licensee.6 9 Based on this policy preference, the
Court eradicated patent licensee estoppel, which would drastically change the
context in which marking estoppel could be invoked.70 After Lear, suddenly there
were two contexts in which marking estoppel could be applied-patent infringement
denials and patent validity challenges.

C. MarkingEstoppelAfter Lear
In the wake of the Lear decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit was the first to consider how the doctrine of marking estoppel would
apply in this new landscape. 71
In Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical
Development Corp.,72 the Seventh Circuit first noted that the district court's ruling,
based on the theory of licensee estoppel, was overruled in light of Lear.7 3 Without the
aid of licensee estoppel, the licensor argued that marking estoppel could be invoked
to produce the same result as licensee estoppel.74 In rejecting this argument, the
court held "as a matter of law that licensees are no longer estopped to challenge the
validity of a licensed patent merely because they have marked their products with
75
the patent number."
In another case, decided by the same panel of the Seventh Circuit, the court was
presented with an opportunity to clarify marking estoppel's effect on a marker's
denial of infringement.7 6 The district court ruled that the defendant's apparatus did
not infringe the patent in suit yet held the defendant liable for royalties under the
doctrine of marking estoppel. 77 The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's noninfringement decision, holding the defendant's apparatus infringed the patent, both
literally and under the doctrine of equivalents. 78 As a result of this holding of
infringement, the court stated, "it is unnecessary for us to decide the question
Id.at 670-71 (emphasis added).
(3 Id.
70 Id.at 671 ("We are satisfied that Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v.Hazeltine Research, Inc., [339
U.S. 827 (1950)], itself the product of a clouded history, should no longer be regarded as sound law
with respect to its 'estoppel' holding, and that holding is now overruled."). The Automatic Radio
"estoppel" holding prohibited a licensee from "challeng[ing] the validity of the licensed patents."
Automatic Radio, 339 U.S. at 836.
71 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970).
68

72 Id

73Id.at 58.
74

Id.

7,Id.at 59 (emphasis added); see Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1369
(7th Cir. 1974) (ruling that a licensee "isnot estopped from challenging the validity of the patent");
Precision Shooting Equip., Inc. v. Allen, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 460-61 (E.D. Ill. 1978) (holding
that past and continued marking by a party will not bar or estop a validity challenge).
76 Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. (Crane I1i, 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974).
77 Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. (Crane -, 364 F. Supp. 547, 559, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd in
part,rev'din part,504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974).
78 Crane I 504 F.2d at 1091.
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whether the court was right in holding defendant liable by reason of marking
[estoppel]. We express no opinion on that phase of the decision below."'79 The district
court's unreviewed finding, however, that the defendant had "a specific intent to
mark" suggests an extra requirement of scienter 0 may be necessary before marking
81
estoppel will preclude a party from denying infringement.
Indeed, that is exactly what the Second Circuit held in Boyd v. Sehildkraut
Giftware Corp.8 2 In Boyd, although the licensee modified its product such that it was
no longer covered by the licensed patent, the licensee inadvertently marked the
modified product with the patent number.8 3 The court found that a "mismarker" who
is accused of infringement should be able to defeat a claim of marking estoppel by
showing the mismarking was inadvertent and limited in time.8 4 Mismarking is
defined by statute and includes the act of marking a patent number on a product
with the intent of deceiving the public and inducing them to believe that product was
made or sold with the consent of the patentee.8 5 Although the Boyd court ruled that
inadvertent mismarking for a limited time did not result in estoppel, it did note that
"deliberate mismarking of even a limited nature or inadvertent mismarking over a
prolonged period would justify an estoppel."8 6 This was the first case to suggest that
an element of scienter was required for marking estoppel to apply.
To date, only a single district court judge has rejected the doctrine of marking
estoppel, ruling that the "marking estoppel doctrine ... is no longer viable and is

7')Id.
at 1093. Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's silence, after Lear, on the effect of
marking estoppel on a denial of infringement, district courts in Illinois have held that the doctrine
does not preclude such a denial. See, e.g., Precision Shooting, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 460-61
(holding that past and continued marking by a party will not act as a bar or estoppel to a denial of
patent infringement).
80 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) ("2. A mental state consisting in an intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.").
81 Crane j 364 F. Supp. at 560. But e£ id. (noting the absence of authority requiring "wrongful
intent" in marking estoppel cases).
82 936 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1991). Boyd was a suit for royalties under a patent license, a state law
claim. Id. at 80. The federal case arose under diversity jurisdiction. Id. Thus, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit exercised appellate jurisdiction rather than the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.
83 Id. at 79.
84 Id. However, the court went on, '[o]f
course, deliberate mismarking of even a limited nature
or inadvertent mismarking over a prolonged period would justify an estoppel." Id.; see also Slip
Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven assuming the
doctrine remains viable, it. . . 'should arise only when a consideration of all aspects of a defendant's
pertinent conduct makes it inequitable for him to take a position contrary to his prior statements or
actions.') (quoting Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79); Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F. Supp.
2d 372, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal dismissed,95 F. App'x 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating if "a party
knowingly and deliberately marks its product with a patent number for a period of years, thereby
representing to the public that the product is covered by the patent, that party is estopped from
later denying in an infringement suit that the product is covered by the patent"); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 298 F. Supp. 718, 733 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (noting that
mismarking that was "mistakenly and innocently made with no intent to deceive ...is not a basis
for estoppel").
85 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (2006).
8 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79.
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inconsistent with the provisions of Title 35 [of the United States Code]."87 On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit responded, stating "[i]t is
88
not necessary to decide whether the doctrine of marking estoppel is still viable."

The Federal Circuit has issued only three opinions that substantively mention
the doctrine of marking estoppel.8 9 In all three opinions, the court has questioned
the continued viability of the doctrine. 90 Further, the court has found the doctrine
inapplicable in all three cases. 91
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has given only a precious few insights into the
doctrine. The court has ruled that an admittedly noninfringing product may not be
treated as an infringing product solely due to application of the doctrine of marking
estoppel. 92 Probably more importantly, the court has indicated that if viable,
application of the doctrine of marking estoppel would likely require a showing of
93
scienter.

II. ANALYSIS
The sporadic appearance of the doctrine of marking estoppel in the past
combined with the Federal Circuit's questioning commentary now leaves uncertain
the precise status of the doctrine and under what circumstances it might be used.
Section A reasons that, notwithstanding suggestions to the contrary, the doctrine of
marking estoppel remains viable. This still leaves the question of how the doctrine
impacts patent infringement denials and patent validity challenges. Section B
examines the relationship between the doctrine of marking estoppel and patent
infringement denials, and Section C explores the circumstances in which marking
estoppel has been used to defeat patent validity challenges. Finally, Section D
addresses the equitable aspects of the doctrine of marking estoppel.

87 High Frequency Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (High Frequency 1), 892 F. Supp.
1515, 1519 (S.D. Fla. 1995), af,
(High Frequency Ifi, No. 95-1468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996).
88 High FrequencylI,1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4.
89 Slip Track, 113 F. App'x at 930; High FrequencylI,1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957; Smithkline

Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
90 Slip Track, 113 F. App'x at 934 ("even assuming the doctrine [of marking estoppel] remains
viable"); High Frequency I, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4 ("regard-less of [the doctrine of
marking estoppel's] vitality"); Smithkline, 859 F.2d at 890 ("[w]hatever the validity of the 'marking
estoppel' line of cases").
91 Slip Track, 113 F. App'x at 934 ("[The doctrine of marking estoppel] does not apply to the
facts of this case."); High Frequency 1, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4 ("[T]he doctrine [of
marking estoppel] is inapplicable under the circumstances of this case."); Smithkline, 859 F.2d at
890 ([W]e do not find [the marking estoppel line of cases] applicable to the present case.").
92 Smithkino, 859 F.2d at 891. The Smithklno court was confronted with a product that the
plaintiff admitted was not covered by its patents either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.
Id. at 890. Nonetheless, the defendant marked its product with the number of the plaintiffs patent.
Id. at 881.
93 Slip Track, 113 F. App'x at 934 ("[The doctrine of] marking estoppel, like other varieties of
estoppel, should arise only when a consideration of all aspects of a defendant's pertinent conduct
makes it inequitable for him to take a position contrary to his prior statements or actions."
(alteration in original) (quoting Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991))).

[7:573 2008]

Rediscovering the Doctrine of Marking Estoppel

A. The Doctrine of MarkingEstoppel Remains Viable
There can be little doubt the doctrine of marking estoppel remains viable. The
doctrine has been around for quite a long time. 94 The contours of the doctrine have
been defined and modified many times. 95 Modern courts, including the Federal
Circuit, have referred to marking estoppel. 96 The Federal Circuit has even rejected a
97
district court's conclusion that the doctrine was extinct.
That leading patent law treatise authors have written on the doctrine98 suggests
the continued viability of marking estoppel. Although the Federal Circuit has yet to
explicitly adopt marking estoppel or apply it to the facts of a case, the court has
commented on the doctrine. 99 Thus, even if it did not explicitly recognize the
doctrine, the court's passing mention of it, in and of itself, suggests that the doctrine
of marking estoppel is still viable.
Given the close relationship between the doctrines of patent licensee estoppel
and marking estoppel, 100 one might have questioned whether the Supreme Court's
decision in Lear10 1 eviscerated marking estoppel along with patent licensee estoppel.
An answer to the question came less than fifteen months after Lear, when the
Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Beckman, reanalyzing the doctrine of marking
estoppel as an independent legal doctrine in the absence of patent licensee
estoppel. 10 2 A number of other courts followed suit and continued to apply the
doctrine of marking estoppel even though the doctrine of patent licensee estoppel was
91See Kant-Skore Piston Co. v. Sinclair Mfg. Corp., 32 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1929); Piaget Novelty
Co. v. Headley, 108 F. 870 (2d Cir. 1901); Regina Music Box Co. v. Newell, 131 F. 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.

1904).
95 See Crane Co. v. Aeroquip Corp. (Crane I), 504 F.2d 1086 (7th Cir. 1974); Kraly v. Nat'l
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366 (7th Cir. 1974); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical
Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1970); Gridiron Steel Co. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 361 F.2d
791 (6th Cir. 1966); Consol. Electrodynamics Corp. v. Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 260 F.2d 811
(10th Cir. 1958); Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 186 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1951); Harley C.
Loney Co. v. Perfect Equip. Corp., 178 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1949); Collis Co. v. Consol. Mach. Tool
Corp. of Am., 41 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1930); Precision Shooting Equip., Inc. v. Allen, 199 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 459 (E.D. Ill. 1978); Eastman Kodak Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 298 F. Supp. 718
(E.D.Tenn. 1969); Canaan Prods., Inc. v.Edward Don & Co., 273 F. Supp. 492 (N.D.111. 1966), afd
388 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1968); Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp.

401 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
96 See SlP Track, 113 F. App'x at 930; High Frequencylj, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4;
Boyd, 936 F.2d at 76; Smithkline, 859 F.2d at 878; Barnett v. Strom, 265 F. Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Ill.
2003); Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 372 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal
dismissed, 95 F. App'x 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
97High Frequency I
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4 (rejecting the district court's
determination that "the doctrine is no longer viable" and stating that "regard-less [sic] of its vitality
as a general matter, the doctrine [of marking estoppel] is inapplicable under the circumstances of
this case").
98 See 5B CHISUM, supra note 3, § 18.06[1][e]; HARMON, supranote 61, § 12.4(d).
99Slip Track, 113 F. App'x at 934; High Frequency 1$, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *4;
Smithkline, 859 F.2d at 890.
100See, e.g., Beckman, 433 F.2d at 59 (observing that "arguments in support of [the doctrines
of marking estoppel and licensee estoppel] sound very similar" and extending the reasoning of Lear
to marking estoppel); Dwight &Lloyd 44 F. Supp. at 401.
101Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969) (setting aside the doctrine of patent licensee
estoppel).
102 Beckman, 433 F.2d at 55.
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no longer available. 103
Indeed, this should have been expected, for Lear dealt
exclusively with patent licensee estoppel and abandoned that doctrine based on
policy considerations concerning the relationship of the patent laws with contract
10 4
laws, considerations which do not apply to marking estoppel.
The viability of marking estoppel, however, is only the penultimate issue. The
more important questions are whether marking estoppel can be invoked to prevent
denials of patent infringement and whether marking estoppel precludes patent
validity challenges.

B. MarkingEstoppel & PatentInfringement Denials
Since its inception, the doctrine of marking estoppel has been used to preclude a
marker's denial of patent infringement. 10 5 Many of the older decisions that applied
the doctrine to prevent infringement denials did not explicitly state a policy rationale
justifying the application of the doctrine. 10 6 Since then, however, a series of policy
rationales have been suggested for applying the doctrine of marking estoppel to
prevent a denial of infringement.
One justification notes that by marking a product as covered by a patent, a party
is holding out to the public that a license remains in effect. 10 7 Although not explicitly
mentioning this rationale, several other courts have breathed life into it by treating
markers as operating under a license.10 8 A related rationale details that by marking
a product, a party is holding out to the public that the product is produced under the
patent. 10 9 A third rationale is that by marking a product as patented, the marker is
holding off competition in the marketplace. 110
103 Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1991); Barnett v. Strom, 265 F.
Supp. 2d 946 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 372
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), appeal dismissed,95 F. App'x 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
104 See Lear, 395 U.S. at 656 (stressing "the strong federal policy favoring free competition in
ideas which do not merit patent protection"); Id. at 670 (recognizing that licensees may be the only
party with enough incentive to challenge a patent); Id. (predicting that the public will have to "pay
tribute" to invalid patents without validity challenges by licensees).
105 See Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley, 108 F. 870, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1901).
106 See, e.g., Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 1941) ("Defendant, in view of all the circumstances can not successfully maintain in this
action that the [marked products] did not embody such patents."); Piaget,108 F. at 872-73 ("We are
satisfied that now ... it does not lie in the mouth of [the defendant] to assert ... that the [products]
he used to stamp and sell as being within said patent are not infringements.").
107 Kant-Skore Piston Co. v. Sinclair Mfg. Corp., 32 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1929) (equating
marking with "deliberately purporting to manufacture and sell [products] under the patent and the
contract"); Regina Music Box Co v. Newell, 131 F. 606, 606-07 (S.D.N.Y. 1904) (marking leads "the
purchaser to believe that the license still continues").
108 Kraly v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 502 F.2d 1366, 1372 (7th Cir. 1974) (noting the
"eminently correct" decision of the district court in enforcing a license until the licensee ceased
marking its products as covered by the patent); Kant-Sko-re, 32 F.2d at 886 (treating a party as if
still operating under a license so long as it continued to mark its products).
109 Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting that only de
minimis mismarking does not present adverse effects on the consuming public); Harley C. Loney Co.
v. Perfect Equip. Corp., 178 F.2d 165, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1949) (marking is "a representation to the
public that ... the product marked is authorized to be manufactured and sold under the patent");
Collis Co. v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp. of Am., 41 F.2d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1930) (marker was "falsely
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All three of these rationales are derivatives of one another and seem to argue
the same point: by marking a product as patented, the marker is holding out to the
public that the product is protected in the marketplace by a patent's limited
monopoly.111 During the term of a patent1 12 a patentee has the exclusive right to
manufacture, use, and sell the patented invention. 113 Marking is a way for a party to
take advantage of this monopoly grant because it deters other competitors from
114
interfering with the constitutionally authorized statutory grant of a monopoly.
The deterrent effect of a patent mark on a product can only come from the
assumption that the product itself embodies the limitations of the patent. 11 5 Courts
have recognized that it is manifestly unjust to allow the marker, having taken
advantage of this assumption and marked a product as covered by a patent, to
116
subsequently claim the product does not embody the claims of the patent.

C. MarkingEstoppel & Patent Validity Challenges
When the doctrine of marking estoppel first emerged, there was no reason to
apply it to a patent validity challenge because such a challenge was dismissed on the

representing that [its] device was protected by patent"). It has been implied that only a significant
marking may put the public on notice that the product is authorized under a patent. Kenyon v.
Automatic Instrument Co., 186 F.2d 752, 756 (6th Cir. 1951) (stating that "the inclusion of the
patent number in a somewhat meaninglesspatent notied' did not justify applying marking estoppel)
(emphasis added).
10Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir. 1970)
(acknowledging that "[p]erhaps it is true that such marking provides the licensee with additional
protection from competitors"); Colis, 41 F.2d at 645 (noting that the marker had "enjoyed the
benefits of the monopoly protected by [the] patent"); Kant-Skore, 32 F.2d at 885 (observing that the
defendant, by marking, had gained "protection in fact from interference by plaintiff and all third
parties with the monopoly of its article"); Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F. Supp.
2d 372, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Having asserted for years that the accused merchandisers are covered
by the [patent] and reaped the benefits of that protection it would be inequitable to allow [the
defendant] to now assert that those merchandisers are not covered by the patent at issue.").
I See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964) ("The grant of a patent is the grant of a statutory monopoly.").
112 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (defining a patent term as ending twenty years from the date of
application).
113 Id. § 27 1(a) (defining an infringer as one who "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell,
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any
patented invention during the term of the patent"); Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545
U.S. 193, 195 (2005).
114 Kant-Skore, 32 F.2d at 885 (observing that the defendant, by marking, had gained
"protection in fact from interference by plaintiff and all third parties with the monopoly of its
article").
115 See 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (requiring notice in order to collect infringement damages and
sanctioning actual notice via marking).
116 See, e.g, Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F. Supp. 2d 372, 386 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("Having asserted for years that the accused merchandisers are covered by [the patent] and
reaped the benefits of that protection, it would be inequitable to allow [the defendant] to now assert
that those merchandisers are not covered by the patent at issue.").
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basis of licensee estoppel. 117 In fact, with few exceptions, patent validity challenges
were routinely disposed of by other means despite the fact marking estoppel was
a
available 118

The notable exception to this pattern in the early case law was Regina Music
Box. 119 In Regina Musie Box, the court specifically noted that not only had the
defendant continued to manufacture the patented music boxes without a license, it
had also naively continued to place a patent stamp on the products.1 20 Licensee
estoppel could not be invoked in that case because there was no valid license
agreement in effect at the time of suit. 12 1 Assignor estoppe

122

could not be invoked

123
either because the defendant was not the patentee or assignor of the patent.
Apparently, with no other way of holding the defendants estopped to challenge the
124
validity of the patent, the court invoked the doctrine of marking estoppel.
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit readdressed
marking estoppel in Beckman, after Lear, the court compared the policies behind
marking estoppel with those behind licensee estoppel. 125 The court noted that the
"arguments in support of [the doctrines of licensee estoppel and marking estoppel]
sound very similar." 126 Although this might be the case with regard to patent
validity challenges, it is not true with regard to denials of infringement. 127 The
public interest which demands that licensees, and perhaps marking parties, be free
to challenge the validity of a patent is not implicated in a patent infringement claim
because a patent infringement claim is a private cause of action between two parties.
It should have been clear that courts would not allow marking estoppel to serve
as a backdoor to the Supreme Court's decision in Lear. Consider a common scenario
wherein a patentee licenses its patent. The license may include language that it only
128
covers products that would otherwise infringe a valid claim of the patent.
Alternatively, the license may identify the covered products by model number. In

117
118

See Piaget Novelty Co. v. Headley, 108 F. 870, 871 (2d Cir. 1901).
See, e.g., Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401, 402

(S.D.N.Y. 1941) (licensee estoppel); Piaget,108 F. at 871 (licensee estoppel).
119 Regina Music Box Co. v. Newell, 131 F. 606 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904).
120 d. at 606.
121Id.
122 See Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342, 351 (1924)
(describing the doctrine as precluding an assignor from challenging the validity of its own patent);
Diamond Scientific Co. v. Ambico, Inc., 848 F.2d 1220, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Assignor estoppel is
an equitable doctrine that prevents one who has assigned the rights to a patent (or patent
application) from later contending that what was assigned is a nullity.").
12:3Regina Music Box, 131 F. at 606.
124 Id. at 607.
125 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir. 1970).
126 Id.
127 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670-71 (1969). The Court identified the "important
public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part

of the public domain" as the rationale for permitting licensees to challenge the validity of a licensed
patent. Id. This policy rationale does not apply in the infringement context because there is no
danger of the public being "required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification." Id. at 670.
128 See Seroctin Research & Techs., Inc. v. Unigen Pharms., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 2008

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10674, at *5-6 (D. Utah 2008) ("The License Agreement defines [the licensed
product] as a product in the scope of a claim or claims of the '308 patent.").
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order to reserve for itself the opportunity to collect maximum damages from future
infringers, the patentee will likely require the licensee to mark its products with the
patent number. 129 The licensee, in accordance with the license, then marks its
products with the number of the licensed patent. If the mere existence of a license
could not preclude a patent validity challenge, there is no reason why the marking
requirement of a license agreement alone could bar a patent validity challenge.
Marking estoppel can be invoked against non-licensees, like unauthorized
markers,13 0 as well as licensees. Examining the Beckman decision from the public's
point of view, as Lear seems to instruct1 3 , there is no difference between a licensee
and an unauthorized marker. In both cases, a product with a patent number marked
on it deters competition and increases consumer expectations.
In ordinary
circumstances, neither the competitor nor the consumer will know whether the
marker is a licensee or an unauthorized marker. Nonetheless, the effect on the
competitor and the consumer should be the same. Thus, the Beckman court's
reasoning would be equally applicable to cases where the marker was not a licensee.
Since the Beckman decision, there have not been many reported decisions
involving marking estoppel. This may be one of the reasons the Federal Circuit has
1 32
questioned the continued viability of the doctrine.

D. Implieations of Equity
One of the only other significant marking estoppel cases to be decided since Lear
was Boyd v. Sehildkraut Giftware Corp.133
In Boyd, the court conditioned
applicability of the doctrine of marking estoppel on a showing of scienter on the part
of the marker. 13 4 The court incorporated the scienter requirement of the mismarking
1 36
statute 13 5 into the doctrine of marking estoppel.
According to the Boyd court, the scienter element of marking estoppel may be
met in one of two ways. 13 7 First, deliberate mismarking for any period of time would

12935 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (limiting infringement damages to those occurring after actual
notice and allowing patent marking as permissible actual notice).
130 Id. § 292(a) (including in the definition of false markers those who mark a product with the
intent of counterfeiting or imitating a patentee's mark).
131Lear, 395 U.S. at 670 (remarking that "the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily
when they are balanced against the important public interest").
132 Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven
assuming the doctrine remains viable, it does not apply to the facts of this case."); High Frequency
Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (High FrequencyIl, No. 95-1468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
9957, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996) ("It is not necessary to decide whether the doctrine of marking
estoppel is still viable."); Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d 878, 890 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) ("Whatever the validity of the 'marking estoppel' line of cases, we do not find [them]
applicable to the present case.").
133936 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1991).
134 Id. at 79.
135 35 U.S.C. § 292(a).
136 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79 (referring to "the scienter requirement of the mismarking offense"); see
Dwight & Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(applying marking estoppel "inview of all the circumstances").
137 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79.
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justify the application of marking estoppel. 138 Second, innocent or unintentional
marking for a prolonged period would warrant marking estoppel.1 39 For instance, if a
manufacturer intentionally placed a patent number on its product in order to deter
competition even though the manufacturer had no rights to the patent, the scienter
requirement would be met. Alternatively, if a licensee placed a patent number on its
product for a prolonged period of time, even under the license, the scienter element
would also be met.
As an equitable doctrine, 140 the application of marking estoppel should be
limited as fairness and justice demand. 14 1 In this light, the requirement that a party
demonstrate scienter to establish liability under the doctrine of marking estoppel
seems exceedingly reasonable.
Another aspect of the doctrine of marking estoppel is that, as an equitable
doctrine, it is subject to the doctrine of unclean hands. 142 The doctrine of unclean
hands prevents a party from asserting an equitable defense if that party has acted
inequitably itself.143 Thus, a party asserting the doctrine of marking estoppel should
not be able to benefit from its application if the party has violated some equitable
principle. This view of the doctrine of marking estoppel would mean that a party
invoking the doctrine would have to come to court "with clean hands" to successfully
1 44
assert marking estoppel.

III. PROPOSAL
The context in which the doctrine of marking estoppel is asserted should
determine its applicability. Section A reasons that the doctrine of marking estoppel
should act as a bar to patent infringement denials. Section B contends that, in light
of important public interests, the doctrine of marking estoppel should not preclude
patent validity challenges. Finally, section C suggests how two equitable principles
complement the doctrine of marking estoppel.

138 Jd.; soee also Slip Track Sys., Inc. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(refusing to apply marking estoppel because there was no evidence of deliberate mismarking).
139 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79.

140 High Frequency Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (High Frequeney If), No. 95-1468,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996) (referring to "the equitable doctrine of

patent marking estoppel").
141 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 110 (2007) ("The court will grant relief only when fairness and
good conscience demand it."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 578 (8th ed. 2004) (defining equitable as: "1.
Just; consistent with principles of justice and right. 2. Existing in equity; available or sustainable
by an action in equity, or under the rules and principles of equity").
142 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (reciting
"the equitable maxim that 'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands').
143 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the clean-hands doctrine as "[t]he
principle that a party cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has
violated an equitable principle, such as good faith").
144 Precision fInstrument, 324 U.S. at 814 (observing that "he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands").
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A. The Doctrine PrecludesInfringement Denials
The doctrine of marking estoppel should operate to preclude a marker from
denying patent infringement because of the private nature of infringement and
traditional notions of equity. 145 In Lear, the Supreme Court instructed that the
"important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas"
is paramount to the "technical requirements of contract doctrine." 146 However, a
patent infringement claim does not involve this public interest because infringement
only affects the parties to the litigation. 147 A finding of infringement does not result
in the public "pay[ing] tribute to would-be monopolists without need or
justification."1 48 Rather, the only payment from such a finding would be between the
parties.

149

When the public interest described in Lear is not implicated, other interests
should control.1 50 The equities between a licensor and licensee are rooted in contract
1 52
doctrine.1 51 Although these interests must yield to the "important public interest"
in patent validity challenges, they may, and should, control in patent infringement
denials.
A traditional view of estoppel also calls for the conclusion that marking should
act as a bar to denying infringement of the marked patent. By marking its product
with a patent number, a marker holds out to the public that its product is protected
in the marketplace by a patent's limited monopoly. 153 Marking deters the marker's
'H5 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004) (defining estoppel as a "bar that prevents one
from asserting a claim.., that contradicts what one has said or done before").
146Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969); see also Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d
1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that the important public interest identified in Lear "trumps"
other interests); Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 745 F.2d 27, 33 (Fed. Cir.
1984) (noting that the important public interest identified in Lea±rprevails over other interests).
17 See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (2006) ("A patentee shall have a remedy by civil action for infringement
of his patent.") (emphasis added); Id. § 100(d) ("The word 'patentee' includes not only the patentee to
whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee."); Minco, Inc. v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 95 F.3d 1109, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Under the Patent Act, only patentees
may bring an action for infringement."); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (en bane). The remedies available to a prevailing patentee also suggest the public is not
involved. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 283 (allowing injunctions to issue against an infringer "to prevent
the violation of any right secured by patent"); Id. § 284 (defining how damages, paid by the infringer
to the patent owner, are to be determined).
"1 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
14935 U.S.C. § 284 (defining the damages payable to the successful claimant by the patent
infringer).
150 See, e.g., Hemstreet v. Spiegel, Inc., 851 F.2d 348, 350 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (enforcing a
settlement agreement to pay royalties "involves another public policy totally absent in Lea: the
encouragement of settlement of litigation").
'5' Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
152 Id.

153 See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir. 1970)
(acknowledging that "[p]erhaps it is true that such marking provides the licensee with additional
protection from competitors"); Collis Co. v. Consol. Mach. Tool Corp. of Am., 41 F.2d 641, 645 (8th
Cir. 1930) (noting that the marker had "enjoyed the benefits of the monopoly protected by [the]
patent"); Kant-Skore Piston Co. v. Sinclair Mfg. Corp., 32 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1929) (observing
that the defendant, by marking, had gained "protection in fact from interference by plaintiff and all
third parties with the monopoly of its article"); Elite Licensing, Inc. v. Thomas Plastics, Inc., 250 F.
Supp. 2d 372, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Having asserted for years that the accused merchandisers are
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competitors from entering the market for fear of infringing a patent. Consumers may
also prefer to purchase products covered by patents.
By definition, estoppel "prevents one from asserting a claim ... that contradicts
what one has said or done before." 154 A marker, having benefited from leading the
public to believe that a product embodies a patent, should not be permitted to take a
contrary position in court and claim that the product does not embody the claim
limitations. The two positions are diametrically opposed.

B.

The Doctrine Does Not Preclude Validity Challenges

Unlike denials of patent infringement, patent validity challenges involve
precisely the same considerations that led the Lear court to eliminate licensee
estoppel. The "important public interest in permitting full and free competition in
the use of ideas"155 is equally involved if the case concerns licensee estoppel or
marking estoppel. This public interest trumps any private rights between the
parties. 15 6 It follows then that just as a validity challenge is not barred by the
existence of a license, the act of marking should also not bar a validity challenge.
This result is also in line with the Supreme Court's recent decision in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genenteeh, Inc. 157 There, the Court made clear that a licensee
need not "bet the farm" and terminate the license prior to seeking a declaratory
judgment of patent invalidity. 158 After Lear, many courts required a licensee to
159
terminate the license prior to seeking a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity.
The Medlmm une Court merely took the next logical step from Lear and eliminated
this jurisdictional obstacle. 160 Thus Lear and MedImmune evince a clear policy on
the part of the United States Supreme Court to encourage patent validity challenges.
The conclusion that marking a product with a patent number should not affect a
patent validity challenge is entirely in line with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
At least one court has stated that a patent mark on a product indicates to the
public that the patent is valid. 161 This might suggest that markers should be
estopped from challenging the validity of the patent whose number was marked on a
product. This policy based argument does not have great force however, in light of
covered by the [patent] and reaped the benefits of that protection it would be inequitable to allow
[the defendant] to now assert that those merchandisers are not covered by the patent at issue.").
'5

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 589 (8th ed. 2004).

155 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670; Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2001);

Thompson-Hayward Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 745 F.2d 27, 33 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
156 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
157 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007).
158 Id. at 775 ("The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here)
risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration of its

actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.").
159 See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that
the license "obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit").
160 MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 777 (holding that licensees need not break or terminate license

agreements before seeking declaratory judgments of patent invalidity in order to obtain Article III
subject-matter jurisdiction).
161 Harley C. Loney Co. v. Perfect Equip. Corp., 178 F.2d 165, 169-70 (7th Cir. 1949) ("The fact
that [the defendant] still places upon its manufactured product the number of the [plaintiffs] patent
is a representation to the public that the patent is claimed to be valid .... ").
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the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence, which encourages patent validity
challenges.
According to Lear, licensees, who may be "the only individuals with enough
economic incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor's discovery," 162 are
not estopped from challenging a licensed patent's validity. 163 In light of Medlmmune,
licensees may challenge the validity of licensed patents even more freely because
they no longer need to terminate the license first.164
Given the ease with which a licensee may challenge the validity of a patent,
invalid patents should not now generally permeate the market. The existence of a
patent alone is sufficient to suggest its validity.1 65 Marking a patent number on a
product does not represent to the public that the patent is valid, it merely puts the
public on notice of the existenee of the patent. It is redundant to suggest the
marking also shows the patent to be valid. Surely this argument can only serve as a
"backdoor" to the Supreme Court's rule of allowing patent validity challenges.

C. The Doetrines EquitableElements
There are two main issues that arise from the fact that marking estoppel is an
equitable doctrine.1 66 First, the doctrine should include an element of scienter.
Second, the party asserting the doctrine must come to court with clean hands.
Incorporating a scienter element into marking estoppel is not novel. 167 Even the
Federal Circuit has recognized that marking estoppel may include a scienter
requirement.1 68 Those courts that have explicitly insisted on a showing of scienter
have incorporated the "intent to deceive" scienter requirement from the mismarking

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)
at 671.
1
64 Med[mmune,127 S. Ct. at 777.
165See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006).
166 See High Frequency Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (High FrequencyIf, No. 951468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 9957, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996) (referring to "the equitable
doctrine of patent marking estoppel").
107 Boyd v. Schildkraut Giftware Corp., 936 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (explicitly incorporating
"the scienter requirement of the mismarking offense" into marking estoppel); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 298 F. Supp. 718, 733 (E.D. Tenn. 1969) (refusing to apply the
doctrine of marking estoppel when the "mismarking was mistakenly and innocently made"); Dwight
& Lloyd Sintering Co. v. Am. Ore Reclamation Co., 44 F. Supp. 401, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (implicitly
recognizing the scienter requirement by only applying marking estoppel "in view of all the
circumstances").
168 Slip Track Sys. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citing Boyd with
approval and refusing to apply marking estoppel because there was no evidence of deliberate
mismarking).
162

163Id.
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statute. 169 Thus, scienter may be shown by either (1) unintentional mismarking for a
0
prolonged period or (2) deliberate mismarking for even a short period."7
Including a scienter element with the doctrine of marking estoppel is in
harmony with the doctrine's potentially preclusive effect on denials of patent
infringement.
One of the reasons that the doctrine should prevent patent
infringement denials is that the marker, having benefited from the marking, should
not be able to take a contrary position in court. If a licensee marked a product as
covered by a patent for a prolonged period, even pursuant to a license, the marker
received the benefit of the marking. The scienter requirement would be met under
the first prong and the licensee would be estopped from denying infringement of the
patent. A deliberate mismarker would, under the second prong, automatically meet
the scienter requirement, regardless of intent.
The doctrine of marking estoppel should also be subject to the doctrine of
unclean hands. The party asserting the doctrine of marking estoppel is seeking
equity. As such, that party must "do equity"171 and come into court with "clean
hands."1 7 2 Misconduct by the asserting party should prevent application of the
doctrine against the marker.17 3 A determination of misconduct and its effect is
17 4
discretionary for the trial judge.
Because the doctrine of marking estoppel does not affect a patent validity
challenge, the doctrine of unclean hands also does not apply to such a challenge.
Some might argue that a licensee who has unclean hands should be barred from
challenging the validity of a licensed patent. The fact that marking estoppel does not
preclude a patent validity challenge benefits such a licensee because the licensee can
challenge the validity of a patent notwithstanding the licensee's inequitable behavior.
However, Lear makes clear that the "important public interest in permitting full and
free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain"
is paramount to any interests between the parties.17 5 Thus, the public interest
requires what might otherwise seem to be an unfair result-allowing the licensee
with unclean hands to challenge the validity of a patent even after marking its
169 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79 (explicitly incorporating "the scienter requirement of the mismarking
offense" into marking estoppel); 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) (requiring proof of "intent of counterfeiting or
imitating the mark of the patentee, or of deceiving the public and inducing them to believe that the
thing was made, offered for sale, sold, or imported into the United States by or with the consent of
the patentee").
170 Boyd, 936 F.2d at 79 ("Of course, deliberate mismarking of even a limited nature or
inadvertent mismarking over a prolonged period would justify an estoppel.").
171 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(referring to the maxim, "[h]e who seeks equity must do equity" with respect to avoiding the
application of a laches defense).
172 Id.; Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945).
173jPrecisionInstrument, 324 U.S. at 814 (noting that the doors to a court of equity are closed
to "one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief,
however improper may have been the behavior of the [other party]").
17 See ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1994) (Scalia, J. concurring);
Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 815 (observing that the doctrine of unclean hands "gives wide

range to the equity court's use of discretion in refusing to aid the unclean litigant"); Keystone Driller
v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1933) (noting that enforcement of the doctrine of
unclean hands is "not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that tends to trammel free
and just exercise of discretion").
175 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
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products with the patent number. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
instructed that the doctrine of unclean hands must be suspended "where a private
suit serves important public purposes." 176
In the context of a marking licensee's denial of patent infringement, however,
the situation is very different. The public interest is not involved in a denial of
infringement. The issue is whether the marking party's product infringes the
intellectual property of another. Therefore, there is no reason to suspend the
doctrine of unclean hands. 177 A licensor who wishes to successfully invoke the
doctrine of marking estoppel to preclude a marking licensee's denial of patent
infringement must have clean hands. If the licensor comes to court with unclean
hands and seeks the aid of the equitable doctrine of marking estoppel, the court will
likely refuse to apply marking estoppel. It would be inequitable for a licensor to
benefit from marking estoppel's preclusive effect on patent infringement denials if
the licensor itself had behaved improperly.
Ultimately, these equitable principles-requiring scienter and clean hands-will
help courts apply the doctrine of marking estoppel in the fairest way possible. By
using their discretion, courts can avoid unjust results when applying the doctrine of
marking estoppel. This is especially important because marking estoppel's preclusive
effect on patent infringement denials effectively eliminates one common defense
utilized by accused patent infringers.

CONCLUSION

The viability of the doctrine of marking estoppel has been questioned.1 78 In light
of the Supreme Court's apparent enthusiasm for patent validity challenges, many
more actions involving patent marking in one way or another should arise. Given the
high likelihood that a license requires marking, marking estoppel will soon be a
common claim in the courts and a major concern for parties.
Notwithstanding intimations to the contrary, the doctrine of marking estoppel is
alive and well. The doctrine of marking estoppel may only be applied to preclude
patent infringement denials when the marker has exhibited some degree of scienter
and the asserting party has not engaged in some other type of misconduct. There are
strong policy reasons for not applying the doctrine to prevent patent validity

176 McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 360 (1995) (quoting Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)).
177 See MeKennon, 513 U.S. at 360.
178 Slip Track Sys. v. Metal Lite, Inc., 113 F. App'x 930, 934 (Fed. Cir. 2004); High Frequency
Prods., Inc. v. Wynn's Climate Sys., Inc. (Hih FrequencyI]), No. 95-1468, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
9957, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1996); Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 859 F.2d
878, 890 (Fed. Cir. 1988); HARMON, supra note 61, § 12.4(d) ("The court has not squarely passed on
the validity of the so-called marking estoppel doctrine .... "); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 591 (8th ed.
2004) (commenting that marking estoppel "has been questioned in recent years").
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challenges.
This result is in accord with learned treatise authors,1 7 9 legal
181
180
and most importantly, the Supreme Court's current jurisprudence.
references,

179 See, e.gl., HARMON, supra note 61, § 12.4(d) (defining the "marking estoppel doctrine under
which a party, usually a licensee, who marks its product with the patent number is estopped to deny
that the product is covered by the patent").
180 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 591 (8th ed. 2004) (defining marking estoppel as an "[e]stoppel
that prevents a party from asserting that a product is not covered by a patent if that party has
marked the product with a patent number").
181 See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 777 (2006) (eliminating any
requirement to terminate a license prior to filing a declaratory judgment action of patent invalidity);
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 671 (1969) (setting aside the doctrine of licensee estoppel).

